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The Determinable-Determinate Relation Can’t Save Adverbialism 
Abstract 
Adverbialist theories of thought such as those advanced by Hare (1969) and Sellars 
(1969) promise an ontologically sleek understanding of a variety of intentional states, 
but such theories have been largely abandoned due to the ‘many-property problem’. In 
an attempt to revitalize this otherwise attractive theory, in a series of papers as well as 
his recent book, Uriah Kriegel has offered a novel reply to the ‘many-property problem’ 
and on its basis he argues that ‘adverbialism about intentionality is alive and well’. If 
true, Kriegel will have shown that the logical landscape has long been unnecessarily 
constrained. His key idea is that the many-property problem can be overcome by 
appreciating that mental states stand in the determinable-determinate relation to one 
another. The present paper shows that this relation can’t save adverbialism because it 
would require thinkers to think more thoughts than they need be thinking. 
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1. Introduction 
The ‘many-property problem’ looks to be a decisive reason for abandoning adverbialist 
theories of intentionality. Although adverbialism promises an ontologically sleek 
understanding of various intentional states, the ‘many-property problem’, first offered 
by Jackson (1977) but many times repeated, appears to provide a recipe for creating 
cases in which adverbialists conflate clearly distinct mental states. Jackson’s original 
presentation was aimed at adverbialist theories of perceptual experience, but once one 
  
sees how the recipe works, problem cases can be created for adverbialism about thought 
as well.1 If the many-property problem could be overcome, a once popular theory that 
has very nearly been abandoned would deserve careful reconsideration. It is both 
striking and important, then, that Kriegel (2007, 2008, and 2011) has offered what looks 
to be a new and promising solution to Jackson’s objection, particularly as it applies to 
thought.2 Kriegel believes that ‘adverbialism about intentionality is alive and well’ 
(2008, 89) and that by adopting the theory not only can one quickly solve the problem 
of intentional inexistence, but one can greatly streamline one’s ontological 
commitments. According to Kriegel, the answer to the many-property problem lies in 
appreciating that some thoughts stand in the determinable-determinate relation to one 
another. Although prima facie promising, the present paper shows that appealing to the 
determinable-determinate relation can’t save adverbialism for it creates a pernicious 
problem of its own. Adverbialism is still dead.3 
 
2. The Many-Property Problem 
                                                
1 Adverbialism about thought has been advanced by Goldstein (1982), Hare (1969), 
Kriegel (2007, 2008 and 2011), Rapport (1979), and Sellars (1969). 
2  The present paper will primarily follow Kriegel’s focus, but at the end of the paper I 
will give some reasons for thinking that his putative solution would be no better if we 
were to try to apply it to perceptual experiences. 
3 This is not to say that no other approaches could become available. For example, by 
developing an extended predicate logic, Tye (1989) offers yet another adverbialist reply 
to the many property problem. That approach is beyond the scope of the present essay, 
though it is noteworthy that Dinges (2015) levels a persuasive objection against it. The 
present paper may be seen as an allied paper to Dinges’s in that both are pressuring the 
adverbialists’ hopes of overcoming the many property problem. It is also worth noting 
that Kriegel himself suggests another approach in 2008, footnote 25 and in 2011, 
footnote 110. A detailed treatment of that approach would require a paper of its own. At 
issue presently is the idea that the determinable-determinate relation might provide a 
solution for adverbialists. 
  
One of the most powerful motivations for an adverbialist theory of thought is that it 
handles the problem of intentional inexistence in an extremely elegant way. The 
problem is this: intuitively, thinkers can think about things that don’t exist. But on the 
face of things, to think of something is to enter into a relation with it. But to enter into a 
relation with a thing, that thing must exist. So our thoughts about things that don’t exist 
seem to demand that we add to our ontology non-existent objects, merely intentional 
objects, or some other kind of proxy entities that many philosophers have found 
unacceptable. 
 Adverbialists have a simple solution: deny that thinking about a thing requires 
entering into a relation. Taking a cue from adverbialists about perceptual experience, 
adverbialists about thought hold that what look to be relations are in fact non-relational 
ways of thinking. According to adverbialists, ‘Sally thinks about Pegasus’, despite 
appearances, makes no reference to Pegasus and posits no relation between Sally and 
anything else. Rather, such sentences should be treated along the lines of ‘Sally thinks 
Pegasus-ly’, for when so treated they better reflect the non-relational nature of the states 
they ascribe. When seen in this light, thinking about something is to think in a way 
rather than to enter into a relation with a thing thought about.4 
                                                
4 See Woodling (2016) for an argument to the effect that, despite appearances, 
adverbialism depends on the act-object model for its intelligibility. Of special 
importance to Woodling’s argument is that intentional objects are what subjects take 
their thoughts to be about, which finds support in Crane (2001). I see (along with 
Dinges above) an ally in Woodling, though his arguments are not mine. In reply to 
Woodling, an adverbialist might find fault with the understanding of an intentional 
object which lies at the heart of his paper. For example, suppose one thought that some 
intentional states could fail to be open to introspection and so fall could outside the 
purview of the idea that intentional objects are what a thinker takes her thoughts to be 
about. One might then aim to depart from Woodling’s understanding in favour of a 
 
  
 The theory is attractive, but it faces a version of Jackson’s famous ‘many-property 
problem’. Consider the following distinct thoughts:  
(1) Thinking about a red square and a green circle.  
(2) Thinking about a red circle and a green square.  
Act-object theories can capture this distinction in terms of distinct entities thought 
about. Adverbialists, however, have a difficult time drawing a distinction between (1) 
and (2). According to adverbialists, the truth-conditions of ‘S is thinking about a red 
square and a green circle’ are the same as the truth-conditions of ‘S is thinking red-ly, 
square-ly, green-ly, circle-ly’. For clarity, we can represent those truth-conditions as 
follows, where ‘s’ names our subject, ‘T’ expresses the property of thinking and ‘R’, ‘S’, 
‘G’, and ‘C’ express second-order colour and shape properties that the adverbialist takes 
to be true of the act of thinking: 
T(s) & R(T) & S(T) & G(T) & C(T)5 
The problem for the adverbialist is that the thought just represented, the thought about 
a red circle and a green square, fails to be distinguished from a thought about a red 
square and a green circle. Given the commutativity of conjunction, ‘S is thinking red-ly, 
circle-ly, green-ly, square-ly’ has the same truth-conditions as those just represented 
above. Adverbialists predict one type of thought where there should be two. 
 Perhaps the most obvious solution is to offer additional properties that, as it 
were, ‘fuse’ the properties that we want to cluster together (the colours and shapes in 
                                                                                                                                                       
referential treatment of intentional object. But even so, the many-properties problem 
would still remain. 
5 An adverbialist could also opt for a treatment of adverbial modification in a 
Davidsonian event semantics: ∃e (T(e) & R(e) & S(e) & G(e) & C(e) & Subj(e, s)). Doing 
so would allow the adverbialist to avoid second-order properties. Jackson’s objection 
doesn’t turn on this decision. 
  
this case) so that the needed distinction between (1) and (2) can be drawn. For example, 
the adverbialist might make use of the property of thinking red-square-ly, thinking red-
circle-ly and so on. But as Jackson points out, such a move runs into immediate 
problems. From the fact that one is thinking about a red square, it follows that one is 
thinking about a red thing. From the fact that one is thinking about a green circle, it 
follows that one is thinking about a circular thing. But these inferences apparently fail 
on the fusion view. Because the ‘fused’ adverbs are syntactically simple (which is 
supposed to reflect the existence of wholly distinct properties), there seems to be no way 
to recover the property of being red from the property of being red-square. So, the 
adverbialist either faces the problem of failing to differentiate thoughts that are quite 
clearly distinct, or the adverbialist loses the ability to capture perfectly good inferences. 
 
2. Determinable and Determinate Thoughts 
Uriah Kriegel (2007, 2008, and 2011) has offered a clever reply to the many-property 
problem. When faced with the pairs of thoughts that need differentiating, he suggests 
we adopt the fusion view. When then faced with the hard-to-capture inferences, we 
should look to a non-syntactic explanation. More specifically, Kriegel argues that some 
thought pairs stand in the determinable-determinate relation, and it is this relation that 
explains the inferences. To illustrate the idea, Kriegel asks why we should hold that an 
inference such as the following is a good one: Jill ate a raspberry; so Jill ate a berry. It is 
not the case that ‘berry’ is a syntactic constituent of ‘raspberry’, but the inference is a 
good one nevertheless. What underwrites the quality of the inference, argues Kriegel, is 
the fact that the property of being a raspberry is a determinate of the determinable 
property of being a berry. Adverbialists about thoughts can and should make use of a 
  
similar move. Kriegel suggests, for example, that thinking red-square-ly is a determinate 
of the determinable thinking red-ly. Because anything that instantiates a determinate 
property also instantiates every determinable under which the determinate falls, we can 
see how to capture the inferences adverbialists have had a hard time capturing: John is 
thinking red-square-ly; whatever is a red-square-ly thinking is a red-ly thinking (by 
virtue of the determinable-determinate relation); so John is thinking red-ly.6 
 
3. Why The Determinable-Determinate Relation Won’t Work 
The determinable-determinate relation cannot save adverbialism. Property types that 
stand in the determinable-determinate relation adhere to some widely agreed upon 
                                                
6 Notice that Kriegel’s view is not that a thought’s being determinate or being 
determinable is read off of whether what is thought about is determinable/determinate. 
To illustrate, I might think about a red thing (i.e. instantiate the property of thinking 
red-ly) and I might think about a red and round thing (i.e. instantiate the property of 
thinking red-round-ly). On Kriegel’s view, the latter thought property is a determination 
of the former, but notice that being red and round (what is thought about) is not a 
determination of being red (Funkhouser 2006 and Prior 1949 both offer further 
discussion of determination along a dimension). And related to this point, Kriegel can 
also allow that even if a thought is about a determinable property, the property of being 
that thought might be highly determinate. Now, on what grounds and under exactly 
which conditions Kriegel thinks one thought is a determination of another is less than 
clear, but it is clear that he needs it to be the case that the relation holds when certain 
inferential patterns are in place.  
 
As suggested by an anonymous referee, even though Kriegel does not read off properties 
of thoughts from what is thought about or represented, perhaps he should. For example, 
if the property represented is squareness it is a represented property that falls under the 
determinable quadrilateralness. But ultimately Kriegel and other adverbialists should 
not take this line since this view would have it that anyone who thinks about squareness 
thinks about quadrilateralness which isn’t correct. There are lots of thinkers who 
possess the concept square but do not possess the concept quadrilateral. 
  
truisms.7 We just saw one of them in the preceding paragraph, which Kriegel himself 
makes crucial use of:  
(T1) An object instantiating a determinate also necessarily instantiates 
every determinable that determinate falls under.  
Here is another truism, commonly accepted in the literature, but which is far less 
favourable for the adverbialist: 
(T2) An object instantiating a determinable must also instantiate some 
determinate under that determinable. 
Colour properties are often taken to be the touchstone case of properties that stand in 
the determinable-determinate relation to one another and they serve here to illustrate 
(T2). Consider an object that instantiates the property of being blue. There are more 
determinate properties that fall under the determinable of being blue such as being 
cerulean, being turquoise, and so on. According to (T2), since being blue is a 
determinable property, there must be some or other determinate under that 
determinable that any blue object also instantiates.8 Any stone that is blue is also some 
more determinate shade of blue such as turquoise or cerulean. 
 (T2) yields an absurd view of thoughts. Kriegel provides us with pairs of thoughts 
that he says stand in the determinable-determinate relation. Thinking about something 
red is a determinable of thinking about something red and square on his view. 
Presumably there are many more. Given the good inference from thinking about a 
                                                
7 The classical discussions are Johnson (1921) and Prior (1949). Funkhouser (2006) 
offers a detailed, recent discussion from which I here draw the crucial truisms (T1) and 
(T2). 
8 This needn’t go on forever. The truism would fail to apply to properties that are 
determinate but not themselves determinables of any further determinates (‘super-
determinates’ as Funkhouser 2006 calls them) should there be any. 
  
bumpy red square to thinking about a red square, thinking red-square-ly must be a 
determinable of thinking red-square-bumpy-ly, for instance. But now suppose that Mary 
is thinking about a square, i.e. she is thinking square-ly. There are, according to Kriegel, 
more determinate thoughts that fall under the determinable thinking square-ly such as 
thinking red-square-ly. By T2, there must be some more determinate thought of Mary’s 
by virtue of which she is thinking the determinable thought. But this demands too much 
of a thinker. Surely even Kriegel agrees that it is possible to think square-ly without 
thinking, say, red-square-ly or thinking round-square-ly, or … . Suppose Mary knows 
that someone has left simple puzzle pieces all over her desk and she comes to believe 
that there is a square on her desk. Mary is thinking about a square, but she needn’t think 
any of the thoughts Kriegel would deem more determinate.9 But it is in the nature of the 
determinable-determinate relation that (T2) holds. So Kriegel’s view has the very 
unwelcome consequence that any thought that qualifies (according to him) as a 
determinable thought isn’t one that thinkers can think without thinking some other 
more determinate thought that falls under it.10 At a minimum, that’s one thought too 
many.11 
                                                
9 Depending on the demands one places on having thoughts, things might be worse still. 
A thinker who lacks various concepts may not even be in a position to adhere to truism 
(T2). Imagine a thinker who has only two concepts, one is a concept of an object he calls 
‘Tony’ and the other is the concept of redness. Our thinker thinks that Tony is red but 
isn’t in a position to form any other thoughts at all such as that Tony is a red square. 
10 It is worth noting that the issue here isn’t about the specificity or particularity of 
thoughts. One might be thinking a specific thought or a non-specific thought and the 
trouble for Kriegel still goes through. Suppose John is thinking that there is a particular 
red square on his desk, the very square that he saw there when he left the house earlier 
today, say. Kriegel might aim to capture this as a particular-red-square-ly thinking. 
Thinking about a particular red square entails thinking about a particular square, so 
Kriegel will appeal to the determinate-determinable relation for particular thoughts. We 
can then run the line of argument in the main text that shows that the view demands too 
 
  
 
4. Perceptual Experiences 
As noted above, Kriegel doesn’t offer his suggestion as a way of saving adverbialism 
about perceptual experience, but one might wonder whether his suggestion could 
succeed on that front. For reasons analogous to those just given, such an extension 
would be no better off. If I look at a black, square puzzle piece on my desk, I am visually 
presented with blackness and squareness. As adverbialists would put it, I am visually 
                                                                                                                                                       
many thoughts of John. If, on the other hand, John thinks there is some or other red 
square on his desk, but he has no particular red square in mind, Kriegel might capture 
this as a red-square-but-none-in-particular-ly thinking. But again, the same kind of 
inference to thinking about a square but none in particular is available, so Kriegel will 
hold that there are non-specific thoughts that stand in the determinable-determinate 
relation to one another too. We then run the now familiar objection. The moral is that 
the problem for Kriegel’s view cross-cuts issues about specificity or particularity. 
11 Kriegel’s suggestion concerns the determinable-determinate relation but one might 
suspect that there is a more general strategy here: look for other metaphysical relations 
that might make room for the desired inferential patterns. For example, as suggested by 
an anonymous referee, we might consider the relationship holding between being a 
bachelor and being unmarried. The view would presumably say that certain pairs of 
thinkings or thought episodes are related in the way being a bachelor and being 
unmarried are related, namely that it is analytic that anything that is a bachelor is 
unmarried. In the case of thought we might hold that it is analytic that red-round-
thinkings are red-thinkings. Such an approach would avoid the criticisms in the main 
text and perhaps adverbialists should consider the view seriously. The present paper is 
concerned with the determinable-determinate relation, so I won’t pursue the thought in 
detail. There is, however, a general point worth making that differentiates the 
relationalist approach from both the determinable-determinate approach as well as the 
analyticity approach just mentioned. Whereas the relational theory explains why our 
thought pairs stand in various entailment relations, the non-relationalist approaches 
take those relations to be brute facts – brute analyticities or brute facts about thought 
and determination. Relationalists can appeal to the following: any red and round object 
is a red object, so any thinking of a red and round object will be a thinking of a red 
object (since thoughts are individuated in part by the objects they are about). I don’t 
wish to here suggest that we must avoid brute facts wherever possible, though some 
philosophers may have such scruples. Important presently is that even if we take the 
determination relations amongst thoughts to be brute (and admissible all the same), 
those relations make bad predictions. Perhaps other metaphysical relations are more up 
to the task and adverbialists would do well to pursue such a thought. 
  
presented to black-square-ly. But it seems to follow from being visually presented with 
blackness and squareness that I am thereby visually presented with blackness. 
Following Kriegel’s line, this will be captured by taking the property of being visually 
presented to black-square-ly to be more determinate than being visually presented to 
black-ly. But if that relation holds, the view predicts that if I am visually presented to 
black-ly, I must also be visually presented to in some or other more determinate way 
such as black-square-ly. But it seems that one can simply be visually presented with 
blackness as when one is in a pitch-black room. In such a case, one is not visually 
presented with any shape properties at all. Indeed, for any additional visual presenting 
that Kriegel would deem more determinate, it seems unlikely that it need be a way I’m 
presented to when in the dark room. Intuitively, I’m simply presented with blackness, 
but Kriegel’s view can’t make sense of this.12 
  
                                                
12 Thanks are due to two anonymous referees for their feedback and helpful guidance. 
I also benefitted a great deal from discussions with Tim Button, Craig French, Laura 
Gow, Uriah Kriegel, Bence Nanay, and David Sosa. Special thanks are due to Cody 
Porter who first brought this issue to my attention. 
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